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The importance of sticky prices in business cycle fluctuations has been debated for many
years. But we argue, based on a large empirical literature from the 1950's and 60's,that it is
necessary to distinguish the response of price to an increase in factor prices from its response to an
increase in marginal cost generated by an expansion in production. Consistent with that earlier
literature, we find for 450 U.S. manufacturing industries that prices do respond more to increases
in costs driven by changes in factor prices than to increases in marginal cost precipitated by
expansions in output. We explore two models that can potentially explain these findings. Both break
the link between price and marginal cost, thereby generating what one might naively interpret as
average-cost pricing. The first is driven by firms pricing to limit entry. The second is driven by firms
pricing to limit non-price competition within their market.
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Much work on business cycles has rested on the importance of price rigidities, both
nominal and real, as a source of the size and frequency of fluctuations. These rigidities are
often motivated by costs of one type or another in adjusting prices (e.g., Rotemberg, 1982a;
Rotemberg, 1983). Consequently, recent empirical work on pricing often tests for costs of
price adjustment by comparing the behavior of actual prices to behavior anticipated under
perfectly flexible prices. Examples include Rotemberg (1982b), Carlton (1986), Cecchetti
(1986), Kashyap (1995), Rotemberg (1995), and Sbordone (1998).
By contrast, an active empirical literature on pricing in the 1950's and 1960's was
less connected to models of costly price adjustment. Authors estimated various versions of
what Eckstein and Fromm (1968) refer to as the "price equation." These equations typically
related prices freely to factor prices (labeled the cost factors) and to measures of the rate of
production relative to capacity, such as output or the level of unfilled orders (labeled the
demand factors). A fairly robust result of these earlier studies is that prices respond quite
dramatically and rapidly to cost factors, and therefore average costs, but more weakly to
output movements and their induced movements in marginal cost. Selected examples are
Dow (1956), Wilson (1959), Klein and Ball (1959), Kuh (1959), Zarnowitz (1962), Neild
(1963), Bodkin (1966), and Eckstein and Fromm.
More recent work has not overturned the consensus from this earlier literature that
prices are very responsive to factor prices and average costs, but not to any induced
movements in marginal cost from fluctuations in the rate of production. In fact, results from
Blanchard (1987) and Roberts, et. al. (1994), who do allow for a differential response to cost
and production factors, confirm the earlier findings.
If prices do respond sharply to cost factors, this puts considerable discipline on the
extent and type of price rigidity. In particular, it implies that costs of price adjustment are
not very important.
We can imagine three scenarios under which prices will respond to costs but not to
production. The first is if marginal cost is essentially flat. The second scenario is if there is
significant imperfect competition and the factors that influence the desired markup of price
3over marginal cost cause it to vary in a countercyclical fashion, offsetting the procyclicality
of marginal cost. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) review this line of research. The third
scenario is that firms do not price with respect to marginal cost. It has often been argued
that in practice firms price according to average, rather than marginal, cost. For instance,
see Hall and Hitch (1939), Kaplan, et. al. (1958), and Blinder (1994). But these are attempts
to describe firm pricing, as opposed to providing justification for such behavior. A large
part of this paper is devoted to constructing a plausible model that generates pricing that
looks like average cost pricing.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we examine the response of
industry prices to variations in costs and production for U.S. manufacturing. Our approach
differs from past efforts in a couple of respects. We use more disaggregate, 4-digit SIC,
industry data. We also exploit variations in total factor productivity (TIFP) as a cost factor in
addition to variations in factor prices. This allows us to address whether price fails to
respond to demand because strong increasing returns makes marginal cost relatively flat.
Like previous authors, we find industry price responds dramatically to cost factors. But this
response is considerably less for movements in costs driven by TFP and wage movements
than for movements driven by material and energy prices. By controlling for fluctuations in
industry TFP, we find a much greater response of industry prices to production than do
previous authors. Nevertheless, our results do support the notion that prices respond more
sharply to variations in marginal cost due to cost factors than to similar sized variations in
marginal cost driven by fluctuations in production. We also show that the response of price
to production is much less in some industries than others. In particular, price responds much
less in industries that are concentrated.
In Sections 3 and 4 we present two models potentially capable of generating such
pricing. In both models firms compete with price in the market (Bertrand competition). We
first consider, in Section 3, a limit-pricing model in which a dominant firm chooses price,
not with respect to its own marginal cost, but in line with costs of a competitive fringe.
Sylos (1957), Modigliani (1958), and McCallum (1969) each develop the idea that pricing to
limit entry can generate something akin to average-cost pricing. We find that movements in
marginal cost induced by output fluctuations are reflected in price only to the extent they are
mirrored by movements in the costs of entrants. Furthermore, the response of price to TFP
4fluctuations depends on whether the TEPmovementsalso hit potential entrants. We also
examine how an economy with such pricing responds to economy-wide disturbances to
technology and preferences. We find the model to be less promising for explaining price
rigidity in aggregate. A general expansion, by driving up the cost of capital, tends to
increase the costs of potential entrants as well as the marginal cost of incumbent firms,
thereby influencing prices.
We next consider firms that limit their price markups in order to reduce costly
expenditures among existing firms through non-price competition for market share. As this
model is more novel, we develop it in detail in Section 4. We consider a setting in which
firms have little incentive to cut price because each firm has an ongoing, understood policy
of matching competitor's prices. As a result, price exceeds marginal cost. We then ask,
what if firms can compete for buyers in dimensions other than price, such as through
advertising, shorter checkout lines, or greater service? As discussed by Stigler (1968), firms
will spend on these activities until the activity's marginal cost equals its impact on market
share times the wedge between price and marginal cost. In choosing price, firms weigh the
direct benefit ofa higher industry price against the indirect cost that a higher markup will
cause competing firms to spend more on attempts to gain market share. A key result is that,
although price depends positively on marginal cost, it depends negatively on the slope of
marginal cost. If marginal cost is both upward sloping and convex (to the origin) then price
markups have a strong tendency to offset procyclical fluctuations in marginal cost. At the
same time, prices will respond directly to factor prices. This model is more successful in
general equilibrium in generating rigid prices that exacerbate output fluctuations in response
to both technology and "demand-type" shocks. The model is also consistent with our
observation that price responds less to production in industries that are both concentrated
and engage in a lot of non-production activity.
2. How Industry Prices Respond to Cost Factors and Production
The price equation
Suppose output, t,isproduced with a technology
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Where m is a material input, and v refers to value added produced from inputs of capital
and labor. The functionJ) exhibits constant returns; but we will allow for increasing
returns in the production of value added. Ci,,tanda reflect technological changes that
augment respectively materials and value added in production. The value added comes from
a CES production function with returns to scale equal to 1+i and elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor equal to a
The rate of growth in marginal cost, suppressing time subscripts, is given by
thc = is( —â) + (1—
—â). (3)
Wherea variable with a circumflex denotes that variable's rate of growth. u equals the
gross markup of price over marginal cost (p/nic). s, equals the cost of materials as a share
of revenue. m is the price of materials; Pv is an implicit price, or marginal cost, of
producing units of v. Pv can be evaluated by the extra labor cost required to increase v by
one unit. This is convenient as it eliminates the need to measure movements in the effective
cost of capital. This yields
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s and Sk are the shares of labor and capital costs in revenue. Substituting into (3) gives
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TFPrefers to total factor productivity calculated with marginal cost shares ofus, and
(1/.iSm)respectively for materials and value-added inputs. For ji =1,these reduce to
average cost shares.
6There is a considerable literature directed at the question of whether cyclical
movements in TFP reflect innovations to technology or the impact of increasing returns and
imperfect competition (e.g., Hall, 1988). But for examining prices we do not need to make
this distinction. The growth rate in TFP captures the effects of both technology change and
increasing returns on variations in marginal cost.
Our focus is on examining the impact of cost factors versus fluctuations in
production on prices. In terms of equation (5), we treat the cost factors as the growth rates
in TFP and factor prices (both p,, and w)whileinduced movements in marginal cost are
captured by movements in the labor-capital ratio. Of course, to the extent procyclical TFP
reflects increasing returns to scale, those movements in marginal cost are linked to
variations in output. But increases in TFP will lower average cost as well as marginal cost.
If capital is fixed or quasifixed in the short run, for instance because of internal adjustment
costs (e.g., Lucas, 1957), then movements in n/k will generate movements in marginal cost
according to equation (5), but not comparable movements in average costs. This
corresponds to firms with c-shaped short-run average cost curves.
For the empirical exercise, we first pick a value for the gross markup, p .Webegin
by setting p =1; but then explore robustness to values for p as high as 1.5. This allows us to
construct the variables on the right hand side of equation (5). We then replace the growth in
marginal cost in (5) with the growth in industry price. So we regress the growth rate in
Sk'
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The error term in the price equation reflects the growth rate in the price markup (,i) and
measurement error (e).12 Ifmovements in the markup are orthogonal to these right-hand-
The markup variable p multiplying the revenue shares in equation (6) is estimated as a parameter,
though it is potentially varying over time. So the error also includes a term ()nic where
corresponds to the estimate of p. Also, we measure the rate of growth of a variable by the
change in its natural log, that is,=Ln(x,Ix,1) .Applyingequation (6) in discrete-time
7side variables, then we should expect to obtain coefficients for these four variables of
respectively—i, 1, 1, and 1/
Data
We estimate the price equation with annual data for 1958 to 1994 for 458 4-digit SIC
manufacturing industries. The data are from the NIBER Manufacturing Productivity
Database (Bartlesman and Gray, 1996), with much of it derived from the U.S. Annual
Survey ofManufacturing. In estimating we include time dummies for each sample year. So
the estimates are based on how an industry's relativegrowthrate in prices responds to
relative industry growth rates in the right-hand-side variables, for example relative industry
TFP growth. Material expenditures include expenditures on energy; and the industry price
deflator for materials reflects movements in energy prices for the industry. We use the
measure of TFP growth contained in the Database (again see Bartlesman and Gray), which
is based on measuring separate factor inputs for non-energy materials, energy, labor, and
capital. When allowing for u> 1, we adjust the input weights in calculating the growth rate
of TFP as dictated by equation (5).
Labor hours are measured by the sum of hours of production and non-production
workers. There are no data on workweeks for non-production workers. We follow the
Database's convention of setting the workweek for non-production workers equal to 40. On
a related note, average hourly earnings are based on dividing total wage and salary payments
introduces a small approximation error. These terms are captured in (6) as components of
the measurement error term e.
2Weexamine the price equation in terms of annual growth rates. This renders the variables
in equation (6) stationary; in fact the autocorrelations of the variables in growth rates are
close to zero (Table 2, below). To examine whether a co-integrating relationship exists
among price and the regressors in eqaution (6), we performed unit-root tests on the residuals
from a regression in levels for each manufacturing industry. We were able to reject a unit-
root in the residuals at the 5% significance level for only 87 of 458 industries. By
examining annual growth rates, we also focus attention on short-run movements in prices
and the right-hand-side variables. Where by short run we mean a period over which an
industry's capital stock is relatively constant.
8by total labor hours.3 The results do not appear to be sensitive to reasonable alternatives,
such as assuming variations in workweeks for non-production workers that are comparable
to variations for the production workers. The NBER Productivity Database only includes
the wage and salary costs of labor. In calculating labor's share, we magnify each 4-digit
industry's wage and salary payments to reflect the importance of fringe payments and
employer FICA payments in its corresponding 2-digit manufacturing industry. The ratio of
these other labor payments to wages and salaries in the 2-digit industries, in turn, is based on
information in the National Income and Product Accounts.
We calculate capital's share as value added's share in revenue minus labor's share.
Previous studies (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995; Basu and Fernald, 1997) have calculated
that, given the low level of profits in manufacturing, this yields a result similar to direct
attempts at measuring capital's share.
Results
Table 1 presents our results for the price equation. In all estimation we allow for the
possibility that errors are heteroscedastic with respect to the regressors as well as with
respect to the size of the industry (measured by sales). For this reason the estimation is by
weighted least squares. The estimation places a slightly higher importance on larger
industries. But in practice the results are extremely similar to those obtained by OLS.
Bus (1987) argues that, with important costs of hiring or training workers (Oi, 1962),
average hourly earnings poorly reflect the cyclical behavior of the marginal cost of labor.
He finds that augmenting the average hourly wage for the marginal adjustment cost for labor
or, equivalently, for the marginal impact of hours on overtime payments yields a much more
procyclical measure for labor's effective price. Based on those results, we explored using
fluctuations in an industry's workweek as a determinant of marginal cost. Prices respond
positively to fluctuations in the workweek; but the impact on the other parameter estimates
is minimal. The response of price to the workweek is far less than our calculation of its
impact on marginal cost. Because fluctuations in the workweek may affect the marginal
cost of labor while having little effect on average hourly earnings or average costs, this
provides further support that price responds less to fluctuations in marginal cost that are not
accompanied by comparable movements in average costs.
9We begin by assuming perfect competition: ji= 1.We subsequently consider price
markups as large as 50 percent (/1=1.5).The results are qualitatively similar. (For u =1,
note that (1 —psm)(
Sk)() reducesto Sk(
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Asa first step we ignore variations in TFP, so the growth rate in price is related to
growth rates of material prices, wages, and the labor-capital ratio. We do this in order to be
comparable to the large number of studies cited in the introduction that have not
incorporated changes in TFP. Results appear in Table 1, Column 1. The impact of changes
in the relative price of an industry's materials on growth in marginal cost is completely
passed into the industry's relative rate of price increase. In fact, the output price increases
by slightly more than one-for-one with the implied cost change, having a coefficient of 1.08.
By contrast, a 1 percent increase in an industry's relative average hourly earnings, weighted
by (1— sn,),isassociated with an increase in the industry's relative output price of only .17
percent. Thirdly, a 1 percent increase in an industry's relative labor-capital ratio has an
extremely small impact on an industry's relative price of.07 percent. Thus the results are
consistent with findings in the literature that prices are much more related to factor prices
than to fluctuations in production. But we also see a strikingly larger response to increases
in material prices than to increases in wages.
Table 1, Column 2 presents results accounting for growth rates in industry JFP. As
expected, relative industry shifts in IFP have a dramatic negative impact on relative
industry price changes. But, in contrast with material price changes, the estimated
magnitude of this impact, equaling —.5 1, falls well short of its anticipated impact.
Controlling for TFPgrowthdramatically increases the estimated response of price to an
increase in wages or in the labor-capital ratio. A 1 percent increase in an industry's relative
average hourly earnings, weighted by (1— s,,), is now associated with an increase in the
industry's relative output price of.49 percent. This is triple the magnitude in Column 1.
However, this still falls far short of the anticipated value of 1 percent. A 1 percent increase
in an industry's relative labor-capital ratio is now associated with a .54 percent rate of price
increase. This is almost eight times the estimate obtained when ignoring industry TFP
growth. Yet it remains far less than we would anticipate under a constant markup of price
10over marginal cost. The estimated coefficient of.54 is consistent with the impact of the
labor-capital ratio on marginal cost only if the short-run elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is nearly 2. But research on production and factor demands suggests this
elasticity is not significantly greater than one (Lucas, 1969, Hammermesh, 1986). So we
should expect an estimated impact of Sk(f) onrate of price change of I or greater.
The third column of Table 1 breaks materials into energy expenditures and
expenditures on all other material inputs. Although expenditures on materials, on average,
represent over half the value of gross revenue, energy expenditures constitute only a little
over 2 percent. Price increases for energy have a slightly smaller impact on output prices
than prices for other materials, receiving a coefficient of .94 compared to 1.09 for materials
more generally. But this difference is not significant. From here forward, we do not
distinguish energy inputs from other materials.
We find a much greater price response to material and energy price changes than to
changes in TFP, wages, or the labor-capital ratio. One concern might be that these
differential responses are created by measurement errors that, for some reason, are less
important in measuring material and energy price changes than for the other factors. One
might be particularly concerned about errors in measuring the rate of TFP growth, as its
measurement requires an accurate measure of real output produced.4 For these reasons we
estimate the price equation after first aggregating the 4-digit industry changes into
corresponding 2-digit industries. If the measurement errors are largely uncorrelated across
4We do eliminate 42 observations (out of 16,486) that report extreme rates of change in TFP
of4O percent or more in absolute value. A spuriously high measure of TFP should
exaggerate the rate of TFP that year, but reduce its growth rate for the next. So one gauge of
the importance of measurement error is the importance of a negative first-order moving
average term in TFP growth. But we do not see evidence ofthis. In fact, the rate of TFP
growth is slightly negatively related to its rate of growth two years before (coefficient of
—.05 with standard error .008), but not at all to its growth rate the previous year (coefficient
of—.0l with standard error .008). It is also unclear that measurement error in TFP growth
biases its estimated effect on price change toward zero. Errors in measuring TFPgrowth
reflecting errors in output measurement will tend to be associated with errors in measuring
price changes of an opposite direction. So the bias is more likely in the direction of an
estimated coefficient of—I.
11industries, this should reduce the importance of measurement errors relative to true
movements in the right-hand-side variables.
Results for estimation on the aggregated data appear in Column 4 of Table 1.
Comparing to Column 2, the coefficients are all increased in magnitude, except that for the
growth rate in TFP. The coefficient for material price changes is increased only modestly.
The coefficient on wage changes is the most dramatically increased, rising from .49 in the 4-
digit data to .74 in the 2-digit data. This suggests that wage changes observed at the 4-digit
industry level are either partly mismeasured or partly not allocative (as discussed in Hall,
1980). The coefficient for changes in the labor-capital ratio rises from .54 to .65. We view
this estimate as still small relative to the anticipated impact of an increase in the labor-
capital ratio on marginal cost.
Table 2 presents the standard deviation and autocorrelation for the dependent
variable as well as the four right-hand-side variables. (All variables reflect the residuals
after removing the impact of time-period dummies.) Models of costly price adjustment
typically predict a greater response of price to persistent than temporary changes in factors.
Changes in material prices, which receive the largest coefficient in Table 1, are the most
persistent of the factors influencing marginal cost. However, increases in the labor-capital
ratio are also extremely persistent, with the growth rate in n/k positively correlated with its
prior growth rate. Increases in TFP and wage rates are also quite persistent.
In estimating we include time dummies for each sample year. So the estimates are
based on how an industry's re/aliie growth rate in price responds to its re/alive industry
growth rates in TFP, material prices, wages, and labor-capital ratio. The results, however,
are not sensitive to this choice. Omitting the time dummies, yields very similar results to
those in Table 1, Column 2. More exactly, the rate of material price change receives a
coefficient a little greater than 1, and growth rates in 7FP, wages, and the labor-capital ratio
each receive coefficient of about 0.5 in absolute magnitude.
To this point we have imposed a gross markup of price over marginal cost of one
(,u =1).From equation (6), we see that the coefficient on material price changes is directly
scaled by u, whereas the coefficients on wage changes and changes in the labor-capital ratio
12is scaled by (1 —,us). Therefore,it is worth asking if the large coefficient on material price
changes, compared to the other factors in equation (6), is due to understating the value of,u.
In Table 3 we reexamine results for equation (6), increasing parameter p from 1 to
1.25, and finally to 1.5. The first column of the Table, for p =1,simply repeats Column 2
of Table 1. Turning to Column 2, increasing i' from I to 1.25 does reduce the coefficient on
material price changes from 1.09 to .92. The coefficients for the other factors, however, are
little affected, remaining about .5 in absolute magnitude. Raising p higher to 1.5 further
reduces the coefficient on material price changes to .80. But again the coefficients on the
other parameters do not increase. In fact, the coefficient on the growth rate in the labor-
capital ratio is actually reduced to .44. It may appear surprising that raising the value ofp
can reduce this coefficient, given that the growth rate of the labor-capital ratio is multiplied
by (1 —ps) inequation (6). it is necessary to keep in mind, however, that the definition of
TF.P growth varies as we raise i.goingacross the columns in Table 3. Higher values ofp
place a higher weight on material input and a lower weight on labor and capital in
calculating TFP. This serves, indirectly, to lower the coefficient on the growth rate of the
labor-capital ratio.
Our conclusion, based on Table 3, is that price changes project much more on
material price changes, compared to changes in the other factors, over the entire range of
plausible values for t.
Inthe introduction we refer to a large older empirical literature that estimated price
equations. These studies typically included one or more lagged prices on the right-hand
side. Models of costly price adjustment rationalize including lagged and expected future
prices as determinants of current prices. For this reason, we briefly explore including past
and future industry price changes as determinants of the current year's price change.
Table 4, Column I includes last year's rate of industry price change as a regressor. It
is statistically very significant, but has only a small impact on this year's price change, with
1 percent higher price inflation the previous year associated with .07 percent higher inflation
this year. The estimated coefficients for the factors determining the rate of growth of
marginal cost are little changed from their values in Table I. With costs of price changes,
1—,
13next year's expected price change, generally speaking, should influence this year's as well.
For example, with convex costs of price adjustment (e.g., Rotemberg, 1982b) the estimated
coefficient on next year's expected price change should be nearly as large as that for last
year's price change. In the second column we include next year's expected rate of price
change, where the expectation reflects instrumenting for the 1+1 price change with the rate
of growth in the cost and demand factors from t,i-I,and 1-2, and the output price change
from t-1 and 1-2. The estimated impact of last year's rate of price change is somewhat larger
than when introduced alone in Column 1, now receiving a coefficient of.09. The expected
rate of price change for the next year exhibits a similar impact, receiving a coefficient of.l0.
Cyclical capital utilizat ion and overhead inputs
We have allowed for movements in industry ii7' arising from non-constant returns
as well as shifts in technology. In either scenario price should grow one percent less for
each one percent increase in TFP. But we have seen that one percent faster annual TFP
growth is associated with only about 0.50 percent lower price inflation.
It has often been suggested that cyclical movements in IFP reflect procyclical, unmeasured,
variations in the utilization of inputs, particularly capital. In an appendix we allow for
movements in TFP that derive from varying utilization of capital or, alternatively, from
increasing returns due to overhead inputs of labor and capital. In both cases we still predict
that price movements should display a coefficient of—i (or very nearly —I) with respect to
TFP movements. We do find, for both extensions, that the coefficient on ()isbiased from
1I.Inneither case, however, does this suggest finding a coefficient on ()ofless than one.
Therefore, we do not see these extensions as promising for explaining the results presented
in Table 1.
Cross-Industry Results
Inthis section we examine results for the pricing equation separately by industry and
ask whether industry characteristics, such as the presence of large firms, predict less
14response of price to production. Below we develop models aimed at explaining why firms
might price in a way that resembles average-cost pricing. Both models we consider, pricing
to limit entry and pricing to limit non-price competition, require departing from competitive
marginal cost pricing. So it is natural to ask whether characteristics we associate with less
than perfect competition are associated with the failure of price to respond to fluctuations in
A
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We begin in Table 5 by listing the results for price equation (6) estimated separately
by major industry. More exactly, the 16,444 observations (at the 4-digit SIC industry level)
are first grouped into corresponding 2-digit industries, then separate equations are estimated
for each of these 20 industries. We focus in Table 5 on estimated coefficients for the
variable sk(-). Wenote, however, that price is responsive to the factors determining
marginal cost for each industry. In particular, the variable representing growth in material
prices, receivesan estimated coefficient greater than 0.5 in every one of the 20
industries and greater than 1.0 in most. Looking at Table 5, we see the coefficient estimate
for sk(r)variesconsiderably across the 20 industries. The table has industries sorted in
descending order of this estimated coefficient. Industry prices are most responsive to sk()
inthe primary metals, lumber, and food industries. Each industry exhibits an estimated
response of greater than 0.70. The three industries furniture, printing, and tobacco display
the least response of prices to sk();eachexhibits an estimated response of less than 0.30.
We next ask whether price is less likely to respond to sk() if an industry has
production concentrated in a few firms or if the industry expends significant resources on
non-production activity. These variables are natural for us to consider given the models
explored in Sections 3 and 4. Both models rely on a less than competitive environment. In
the limit-pricing model of Section 3thisreflects the greater productivity ofa market leader.
Taken literally, that model implies a single producing firm in an industry. The model of
Section 4 relies on the ability of firms to match competitor's prices. The connection to
industry concentration is less clear, but we would expect the implicit collusion from price
15matching to be more relevant with fewer competing firms. This model links the failure of
price to respond to 5k(f-) directlyto the importance of spending on marketing and services
designed to influence market share. We view the importance of non-production workers as
a rough proxy for these activities.
We measure the concentration ofan industry's production by the industry's 4-firm
concentration ratio for value added in 1987. For a price change from year Ito 1+1, we
measure the importance of non-production workers by the average of the shares of non-
production workers in employment for year Iand1±1
Table 6, Column I presents results for the pricing equation now interacting Sk()
withthe deviation of an industry's concentration ratio from its average over all industries of
.40. We see that a high concentration ratio is associated with a significantly smaller
response in price to sk(). This effect is both quantitatively and statistically significant.
For instance, for the chewing gum industry, which has a concentration ratio of.96, the result
suggests that price will increase by only 0.39 percent in response to an increase in sk() of
one percent. This compares to a response of .55 percent anticipated for an industry with the
average concentration ratio of .40.
The second column of Table 6 additionally includes a regressor reflecting an
interaction of sk(-) with the deviation of an industry's non-production employment share
from its overall average of.25. The regression shows that a higher ratio of non-production
workers is associated with less response in price to sk() .Butthis result is not statistically
significant.
Summaryand discussion
We find support for the notion that shifts in cost factors are associated with greater
responses in output prices than are comparable changes in marginal cost created by
fluctuations in production. Each percent increase in sk(f) is associated with a price
16response of only about .50 percent. Under a constant price markup, this only makes sense if
the short-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is about 2, which seems
implausibly large. Furthermore, the response in price is less in concentrated industries.
By contrast, increases in marginal costs generated by increases in the prices of
material or energy inputs are associated with one-for-one increases in output prices. We
find an important distinction, however, between these cost factors and the rates of growth in
TFP and average hourly earnings. Changes in these latter cost factors are associated with
important movements in prices, but with a magnitude only about half their impact on
marginal cost.
We have argued that the markup is not constant. In particular, increases in the labor-
capital ratio appear to be correlated with decreases in the price markup, yielding a
coefficient that is much less than one for Sk(f.) . Itshould be clear, however, that we have
only produced estimates of how changes in prices project on changes in the labor-capital
ratio. We have not estimated a structural response of the markup to an increase in
production. In particular, the exercise is silent on whether increases in production create a
cut in the markup in the short run (as in the models below), or perhaps shifts in price
markups due to an other factors are associated with increases in production.
To better get at causality, one ideally would instrument for movements in production
with variables orthogonal to other potential sources of movement in an industry's price
markup. We do not see an obvious way to effectively instrument for all the factors in our
equation (6). Hall (1991), Shea (1993), and Bus and Klenow (1998) each instrument for
fluctuations in production. Hall employs oil, military spending, and political variables as
instruments. Shea employs production in industries that are downstream users of an
industry's production. Bils and Kienow use the durability and cross-sectional Engel curve
of the consumer good produced in an industry, interacted with aggregate fluctuations in
consumption.
Each study finds that instrumented increases in production are associated with
important increases in price. Less emphasis is placed on the behavior of the price markup.
Hall assumes a constant markup. Shea's estimates suggest a significant fall in the markup
17for the first nine, or so, months of an expansion. But typically the markup completely
recovers soon after. Bus and Kienow find that instrumented increases in production are
associated with very significant increases in the wage rates and material prices paid in an
industry. After accounting for these changes in factor prices, their results imply that a short-
run expansion in production is associated with a significant fall in the price markup.
3. Limit Pricing
To explain this behavior of prices a model should generate a greater price response
to increases in marginal cost associated with cost factors than to those arising from
expansions in labor and output. Ideally, the model should also predict a weaker response for
fluctuations in costs generated by changes in JFP or wages than for changes in other factor
prices. In this section we examine a limit-pricing model in which a dominant firm in each
industry sets price just low enough to keep out a fringe of potential competitors. The model
results in average cost pricing. Furthermore, we can rationalize a weaker response of price
to TFP and wages than to other factor prices if variations in TEPandwages for the
dominant firm are not shared completely by the fringe of potential entrants.
We begin by laying out the general economic environment in which firms operate.
This setting is sufficiently general to allow for perfect competition, limit pricing, or the
model of pricing to limit expenditures aimed at market share that we examine in Section 4.
We then introduce assumptions that generate firms pricing to limit entry. Finally, we
examine, by means of impulse responses, how that economy responds to business cycles
driven by shocks to technology or by shifts in preferences that affect market demand.
General equilibriumseiiing
Thereare a large number of identical infinitely lived consumers in the economy.
The representative consumer maximizes expected discounted utility defined over a stream of
consumption, C1 and leisure, I —N1
—
S1where N1 is hours worked and S1 is shopping time
(see Section 4 below).
18max,N,, zi(C÷ J —N1
—S19i+r)]' (7)
(1—N —S
where u(C, ,1 —N
—S; 8) = 8 log C + (I — ti
1—2'
s—Is
= J''[C(j) ]',e>0. (8)
j=1
E isthe expectation operator; the discount factor is /3. Consumption reflects a CES
aggregateof commodity varieties {C1(j)}1=1, withsubstitution elasticity e. Shifts in
preferences between purchased goods and leisure are allowed through variations in &. The
ownership of firms is evenly distributed across consumers, with 7r1(i,i) representing the
profit made by firm iinindustryj. The discount factor, as of/, for nominal expenditures
incurred at t+r is w=1 J[(1+R1 )(1 +). (1 + )]for-r> 0 and w10 = 1 ,whereR is
the nominal interest rate. Denote the nominal wage by W and the price of consumption
goodj by1(j). Then the consumer's lifetime budget constraint is
( P(j)C1+ (I))]=E [IWir ("+rNt+r +ir (/,1))](9)
r=O j rO
The intratemporal and intertemporal first order conditions are
(10)
U1 (C1,1— — S1)
u1(C1,1— N— S1) = E[(1 +R1)—flue1(C11,1 — N+1 — (11) p
where= [J' P (J)1_S]1/(1_S) -
Firm i in industryj maximizes the discounted profit
Et[wtrirt*r(i,I)1 (12)
where r1 (i,j) = p (i,j)y (i,j) — W111 (/J) — P5x (i,j) — WM (i,j)(13)
19k11(i,j) =x,(i,j) +(1—5)k(i,j), (14)
x1(i,j)= J1[x(jjk)]'',e >0, (15)
p (16)
Thefirm chooses price p1 (i, j),productionlabor i (1,1), marketing labor M1 (1, j)(see
Section 4), and investment x, (',i) Capita! is accumu!ated through investment x, (/, j),
which aggregates variety of intermediate goods {x((i,j,k)}kI. ina CES fashion with the
same substitution parameter s as for consumers. The depreciation rate of capital is 8.
Optimal investment satisfies the Eu!er equation
E1[t+11+1—8]=E[(1+R1)], (17)
(+1 (+1
Themarginal profit from an additional unit of capital can be evaluated by the implied cost
____ MPK1 (1
—
reductionin labor purchases, =J4' =
ôk MPL ak (*1 /*1
Generalmarket clearing requires that total labor supplied be equal to the sum of
production and marketing labor demanded by firms.
N1 =11(i,j)+v[1(i,j). (18)
Also, in each goods industry supplies and demands must be equal.
y1(i,j)=C1(j)+ x1(i,k,j) forj=1,J. (19)
Pricing to Limit Entry
Limit pricing implies that the best-technology firm charges the price at the minimum
of average cost of the second best firm (See Figurel). Denote the productivity index of the
20best firm and the second best firm in industryj as cz(1,j) and a(2,j), respectively. The
markup ratio in industryj is
(I)=ac(2,j) (20)
n1c(1,j)
whereacandmcdenoteaverage cost and marginal cost, respectively.
Suppose the production function exhibits a Cobb-Douglas technology,
y(i,j) =a(i,j)k(i,j)111(i,j), andthat there is neither marketing effort on the firms'
part, M, (i, J) =0,nor shopping effort on the consumers', S, =0.The (short-run) marginal
cost of the existing firm is (with normalization of Wto )
mc1 (1,]) =a(1— a) ) a1(1, j). (21)
k(1,j)
We treat the capital stock for the incumbent firm, k (1,1), as given during 1,with
investment during Idictating1+1's capital stock. In essence we are assuming that acquiring
and operating additional capacity during Iisprohibitively expensive reflecting internal costs
of adjustment. This is the source of a short-run ._-shaped average cost curve, and an upward
sloping marginal cost curve, for the incumbent.
By contrast, we assume the potential-entrant firm can purchase capital in order to
produce within the time period. (More exactly, an entering firm can use the CES technology
to form a unit of current capital from a variety of current intermediate goods.) Thus an
entrant is not tied to any preexisting level of capacity. The average cost of a second-best
technology firm is
ac, (2,1)= a_a(I)-(I-a)Ql-a(2,j1, (22)
where Q is the effective rental price of capital for entrants. (Note that this also equals the
marginal cost for an entrant—see Figure 1.) The rental price is calculated as=q,P,
where q, is the implicit real rental rate that an entrant would equate to MPK,. This rental
21S
rate is given by q, = , whereiisthe expected real interest rate for the economy
1+ t,
fromito
In a symmetric equilibrium with J normalized to 1, y1(i, j) =Y,k,(i, j) =K,.,
x,.(i,j)=X,.,C,.(j)=C,., j)=P(j)=P =P=1, a,(1,j)=A,(1),




Note first of all that the bigger is the technology gap between the leader and the
follower, the bigger is the markup. Related to this, price and output respond very differently
to a productivity shift depending on whether it hits just the best-technology, incumbent firm,
just the potential-entrant firm, or both. Figure 2 displays the response to a technology
increase for the potential entrant. This has no impact on productivity in actual production.
It does act to lower the incumbent's price, thus creating a negative markup shock. In sharp
contrast, Figure 3 displays an improved technology for the best-technology firm. This
lowers marginal and average cost but leads to no decrease in price, thus directly increasing
the markup.
The markup also varies with the ratio of the rental price of capital to the labor-capital
ratio. Consider a Irwisifoly increase in L,/K,.. A high current ratio of labor to capital is
associated with a high marginal cost for the best-technology incumbent, But, if this increase
is transitory, that implies the rental price on capital has gone up by less than the current ratio
L/K,.. Therefore average costs for a potential entrant rise by less than the best firm's
marginal cost, creating a decrease in the markup.
An entrant's first-order condition determining demand is
E,[MPK,.
(1 +
+ 15] =1+ Theleft side is the gain in terms of output in 1+1 of
putting P, dollars in capital.Response to economy-wide shocks
We examine the response of the limit-pricing economy to shocks to technology,
either to the incumbent or the potential entrant, and to preferences through the parameter &.
In both the technology and preference shocks we assume the disturbances follow a first-
order autoregressive process with an AR(I) parameter of 0.9 for quarterly observations. We
produce impulse responses based on log-linear approximations to the model's first-order
conditions.
We adopt values for labor share, the discount factor, and the depreciation rate that
are commonly used in the literature: a= 2/3, fl=.99,8= .025. We choose a steady-state
value for 9 so that the steady-state hours of work N equal 1/3. For N =1/3,we choose y= 2
in order that the compensated labor supply elasticity equals 1. We set the substitution
elasticity of goods sequal to 1.3784. This is not important for the results for the limit-
pricing model, but yields a steady-state price markup of 50 percent for the model in Section
4. All parameters remain the same for examining the non-price competition model in
Section 4, with the exception of o the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in production.
Here we assume o-= 1 (Cobb-Douglas). We consider modestly smaller values in Section 4.
The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 7.
Figures 4 through 6 display the economy's response to technology shocks. Figure 4
treats the case of a common increase in technology of one percent. That is, a increases by
one percent for potential entrants as well as for the incumbent firm. The economy's
response is fairly standard. Output increases initially by 1.4 percent, with much of this
increase occurring through investment spending. Marginal cost (expressed relative to the
normalized wage) falls by somewhat less than one percent, reflecting the initial rise in the
labor-capital ratio of 0.6 percent. The rental price of capital, which is mirrored in the
following period's labor-capital ratio, rises somewhat less than the implicit value of capital
to incumbent firms. Therefore the costs for potential entrants rise by less than do marginal
costs for incumbents. This results in a small drop, a 0.1 percent decrease, in the markup.
The relatively small decrease in the markup reflects the high persistence of the technology
shock, and the persistent response it generates in the labor-capital ratio. For instance, ifwe
nflconsider a one percent technology shock with an autocorrelation of .2, rather than .9, the
drop in the markup is much larger, equaling 0.7 percent for the first quarter.
Figure 5 shows the response of the economy to a one percent increase in technology
that affects incumbent firms, but does not affect potential entrants. Because costs for
entrants are little affected, price is almost unchanged. The markup rises by a full one
percent. The rise in the markup mutes to some extent the impact of the productivity increase
on production. Labor input actually falls by a quarter percent. Recent papers by Gali (1999)
and Basu, et. a!. (1998) estimate that technology shocks and inputs are actually negatively
correlated. All three papers point to sticky prices as an explanation for this finding. We
obtain a negative correlation here despite prices being flexible. To the extent that increases
in productivity do not extend to potential competitors, price responds asthough itis sticky.
In Section 2 we found that industry prices responded only about half as much to
industry TFP movements as expected. If we view the shocks to productivity that buffet
producers as roughly an equal mixture of those that hit potential competitors (as in Figure 4)
and those that do not (Figure 5), this would rationalize those findings in Section 2.
The case of an increase in technology for potential entrants, not relevant for the
current producer, is given in Figure 6. This acts like a pure markup shock, as studied, for
instance, by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). Price falls (relative to the wage) despite a
rise in marginal cost. The markup drops by a full percent in the first quarter and remains
persistently low, resulting in a sustained expansion in hours and output.
According to the empirical analysis in Section 2, output price closely reflects the
changes in marginal costs induced by material prices. An increase in input prices other than
capital and labor is equivalent to a decrease in productivity, a, in our production function.
Assuming changes in material prices affect the incumbent and potential entrant firms
equally, then the response of output price to a decrease in material price is very similar to its
response to a common productivity increase for both incumbent and fringefirms. To
distinguish the material price change from the economy-wide productivity increase, which
has an effect on the real interest rate, we examine the response of an industry in a partial
equilibrium environment. The response is very similar to that in Figure 4 for the common
24productivity shock. Consistent with the findingsin empirical analysis, the output price
closely tracks the movement in marginal costinduced by material price changes.
Finally, Figure 7 gives the economy's responseto a 1 percent increase in the
preference parameter that dictatesrelative weights on goods and leisure. The increasein
creates an expansion in hours and output of1.2 and 0.8 percent respectively. Marginal
cost increases initially by 0.4 percent, then graduallyrecedes with the labor-capital ratio.
The markup falls, but only slightly. The reason isthat movements in marginal cost induced
by aggregate output fluctuations are largelyreflected in prices to the extent they are
mirrored by movements in the costs of entrants throughthe increase in economy-wide labor-
capital ratio. Relatedly, if we reduce theautocorrelation of the shock from .9 to .2, so that
the increase in labor is much more transitory, thenthe markup falls by .2 percent in the first
quarter of the shock.
The movement of the markup becomes quite dramatic, however,if we consider a
demand disturbance that is industry-specific instead ofeconomy-wide. In this case, price is
unaffected by an industry-specific demand shock, because costsof entrants are not affected.
This reflects the fact that the real interest rate is notaffected. An increase in industry
demand is met by a dramatic increase in labor-capital ratio,resulting in a large increase in
marginal cost. We find, for a one percent increasein an industry's demand, that the industry
markup of price over marginal cost decreases byabout .5 percent.
4. Pricing to Limit Non—price Competition
There are several criticisms that can be leveled againstthe limit-pricing model of
Section 3. Limit-pricing models are often criticizedfor assuming that entry can be achieved
rather immediately and with little or no up front costs. Secondly,the outcome in the market
is tightly linked to the behavior of costs for potential entrants.But given these potential
entrants do not actually enter, the model is not readilyempirically testable. Thirdly, and
more directly linked to our purposes, themodel does not necessarily generate rigid prices in
response to fluctuations in aggregatedemand and production. As seen in the previous
section, in this case average costs for entrants may movenearly as much as marginal cost for
the incumbent, causing price to move nearly as much as marginalcost. We now move to an
25alternative model of Bertrand competition allowing firms to compete with non-price features
such as marketing for market share.
Marketing Model
Suppressing the industry indexj and time subscript, let there be I firms with the same
cost function, g(y), producing a homogenous good in each industry. We assume these I
firms compete by simultaneously choosing price. Bertrand price competitionamong these
firms would normally lead to a competitive outcome of price equal to marginal cost. But we
add one other aspect to the pricing. Firms have the technology to post not only a price, but
also to offer a guarantee to match other prices. Firms would in fact wish to include such a
provision. So each firm, while posting a pricep(i), is in fact effectively setting the same
price given by: p =min[p(i)J,over 1=1 to I. Each firm is in practice the market price setter
in a downward direction, that is posting a price below others will result in all firms selling at
that price.
Suppose for the moment that, conditional on all firms charging the same price,
market demand is divided equally among the I firms; so each firm receives one 1thof
industry profits. Then each firm, essentially a market price setter, will have an incentive to
post price at the price that maximizes industry profits. The Bertrand-competition result, of
price equal to marginal cost, is replaced with price given by the perfectly collusive price.
(Salop, 1985, and Edlin, 1997, discuss how such price guarantees actually raise prices by
facilitating collusive outcomes.)
Our primary interest, however, is how such firms might attempt to influence market
share through costly non-price competition. To motivate such competition, we start by
assuming that a transaction requires some input of time from both the seller and customer.
Let m be the marketing labor per customer provided by the firm. Let s be the shopping time
6Weassume that firms have the technology to match not only other firms posted prices, but
also other firms posted offers as a function of their own posted price. For example, if
another firm posts an offer to beat firmj's price by amount ,itis understood that firmj will
match that price. This eliminates the incentive for other firms to make such an offer, as
opposed to relying on their own posted price.
26provided by the customer. To accomplish a transaction, the two parties are required to
provide sufficient labor to meet the constraint: b(ni, s) =1,b,,, >0,b >0Of particular
importance, the amount of time a consumer must spend shopping is decreasing in the seller's
marketing or service effort, s =s(rn),s Q< 0 .Inturn, this implies firms can compete for
market share by increasing their choice of in. ni has several natural interpretations. By
increasing marketing efforts, a seller provides information to buyers, reducing the effort
required of the buyer to acquire information on prices and the availability ofgoods. By
providing more sales clerks, a seller reduces the time required of a customer in finding items
or waiting in lines. More generally, any quality dimension that competitors cannot explicitly
match, as they can with posted prices, is a potential margin for non-price competition.7 For
convenience, from here forward, we refer to m(J) simply as firm i's marketing effort per
customer. We denote firm i's total marketing effort by M(i); it equals m(i) times the number
of buyers for firm i.
Since prices are the same across firms, consumers prefer to buy from the store with
the highest marketing effort. This implies that consumers allocate themselves to sellers such
as to equalize ni(i) across firms. This further implies that a firm's sales are proportional to
its marketing effort, or, more exactly
z(i)=D(p) 11M(k)f0r1 1, ...,I. (24)
zQ) is sales for firm i; and D(p) is total industry demand at market price p.
Each firm has two choices: a choice of price and a choice of marketing effort. These
choices can be viewed as a two-stage game. In the first stage firms choose price, aware that
by choosing a lower price than other firms this lowers prices market wide (given the price
matching). In the second stage firms choose marketing effort givenp, the lowest posted
price. It is convenient to consider these choices in reverse order.
Marketing effort M(i) is chosen to maximize
'Carlton(1979) considers costly non-price competition through the size of inventories and
length of delivery lags.
27maxM() pD(p) -g(D(p) -WM(i),for i =1...,I.(25)
Marketing effort reflects time; so the cost of marketing effort equals the wage WtimesM(i).
Evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, M(i) =M(k), for all k. The optimal marketing
expenditure WM is
=z(p)[p-mc(z(p))](1'), (26)
z(p) =D(p)IIis a typical firm's sales; and nic(z(p)) =g(z(p)) is that typical firm's
marginal cost.
Recall that each firm has the ability to lower the market price p. Substituting for W74
from (26), a firm's choice of price is dictated by
max z(p)[p -ac(z(p))]-( ')z(p)[p-inc(z(p))] (27)
Alternatively, we can write the firm's objective in choosing price as sales times a weighted
average of price minus average cost of production and marginal cost minus average cost:
'z(p)[p —ac(z(p))]+(I')(p)[iiic(z(p))- ac(z(pD}. Thisreflects the fact that a high
marginal cost, given average cost, is desirable, as it reduces firms' expenditures on non-
price competition.
Price is set according to
= nic(y)[1 —(1 —1)ymc' (Y)1 (28) e —1 mc(y)
whereeis elasticity of market demand (s= ),y(=z)) is output, and
D(p) mc(y)
represents the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. If marginal cost is perfectly
flat, then the presence of non-price competition has no impact on the market price. But, if
marginal cost is upward sloping, then the presence of non-price competition unambiguously
reduces the size of the markup. The intuition for this is as follows. By selecting a lower
28price a firm creates higher output for all firms. This, in turn, reduces costly non-price
competition, not only due to the lower price, but also due to the higher marginal cost of
sales. Note also that price markup is decreasing in the number of firms (I), provided
marginal cost is upward sloping.
Suppose production occurs under a CES production function with substitution
a—I a
elasticity o y =a[ai a +(1—a)ka Furthermore,let the number of firms be 2. Then,
price in (28) simplifies to
=
e)mc(y)[l _I(la)(L)J] (29) e—1a a k
For the Cobb-Douglas case the markup is simply a constant. But for a less than one the
markup is countercyclical, in that it decreases with increases in the labor-capital ratio. We
will see immediately below that the markup contains quite striking movements even for
fairly small departures from Cobb-Douglas. Note that variations in factor prices or
technology do not affect the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output, so the markup
of price over marginal cost is not affected. Thus this model has the potential to generate a
larger price response to movements in marginal cost associated with factor prices than to
movements in marginal cost generated by movements in the labor-capital ratio.
Response to economy-wide s/tucks
We again examine an economy's responses to aggregate shocks to technology and
preferences, but now under this setting of firms pricing to limit costly non-price competition.
The number of firms in each industry, I, is set equal to 2. The substitution elasticity between
production labor and capital, o is now set equal to 0.85. (Hamermesh, 1986, offers a range
of values for afrom .14 to 2.8. Lucas, 1969, reports a range of values less than 0.8.) We set
the steady-state price markup ratio jiequalto 1.5. For a .85, from equation (29), this
requires a price elasticity of demand equal to 1.3784. This also implies, from equation (26),
a steady-state ratio of "marketing labor" to production labor of 1/8. The transaction
technology is given by b(m,s) = =1;we set u =0.5and s, the steady-state shopping
29time of consumers, equal to 1/24, corresponding to 1 hour of shopping time per day. For
these parameter values, in steady state, half of the profits generated by the markup of price
over production cost is dissipated by firms through expenditures on "marketing labor".
Profits, as a share of total revenue, equal 16.7%.
Figure 8 presents the economy's response to a 1 percent positive shock to
technology. Output increases by 1.4 percent, with niuch of it occurring through investment.
Marginal cost falls by less than one percent (relative to the wage) reflecting the increase in
the labor-capital ratio. Because of the convexity of marginal cost, the markup falls, but by
less than .2 percent. The dramatic increase in investment, combined with the rapid retreat in
production labor, causes the ratio of production labor to capital to actually decrease by about
a year into the expansion. Consequently, the price markup moves from below to above
trend. Reflecting the behavior of the markup, sales (marketing) labor increases much less
initially than production labor, but soon overtakes the increase in production labor.
The last figure, Figure 9, displays the economy's response to a positive shock of I
percent to the preference parameter. The economy exhibits a substantial expansion in hours,
output, and consumption, with production labor increasing by 1.5 percent and output by 1
percent. Marginal cost increases with the sustained expansion in the labor-capital ratio. The
model is very successful, however, in muting the response of price to this movement in
marginal cost—a fall in the price markup offsets about two-thirds of the increase in marginal
cost. For instance, in the first quarter marginal cost increases by 0.6 percent, but price by
only 0.2 percent. This fall in the markup results in a response of output to the preference
shock that is about 25 percent larger in magnitude than for a comparable economy with no
variation in markup. Directly related to the fall in the markup, employment of marketing
labor expands by only about a third as much as does production labor.
This model is clearly capable of generating a relatively weak response of price to
fluctuations in marginal cost associated with variations in output and the labor-capital ratio,
as found in Section 2. This is true even though we entertain a relatively small departure
from Cobb Douglas production (a= .85). The model is also suggestive of the result from
Section 2 of a weaker response in price when non-production workers are more important.
Finally, the greater volatility of production to non-production workers exhibited in Figure 9
is clearly supported by the data (01, 1962, and many others).
304. Conclusions
The role of sticky prices in business cycle fluctuations has been discussed and
disputed for many years. We argue, however, that it is important to distinguish between the
nature of the shocks in describing how prices respond. In examining disaggregate U.S.
manufacturing data, we confirm results from the empirical pricing literature of 1950's and
1960's that prices respond more dramatically to an increase in costs driven by factor prices
than to an increase in marginal cost precipitated by an expansion in output. But we also find
that prices respond considerably more to cost increases due to increases in material or
energy prices than to those due to increases in wage rates or decreases in productivity.
Finally, we find that the response of industry price to fluctuations in production is
particularly weak in industries with concentrated production.
We explore two models we see with potential to explain why price might respond
dramatically to factor prices, yet respond weakly to marginal cost more generally. The first
is a limit-pricing model. The key is that price is dictated by average costs of potential
entrants rather than the producer's marginal cost. It turns out, however, that for a sustained
aggregate increase in production, this model predicts that prices do largely track fluctuations
in marginal cost. A persistent aggregate shock to the economy not only drives up the
producers' marginal costs, but also drives up the average cost of entrants by increasing the
cost of capital. The model might be helpful, however, in explaining the weaker response to
wage rates and TEPthanfor other cost factors. If fluctuations in wages and productivity for
producers are not mirrored by similar fluctuations for potential entrants, then changes in
these factors will not be passed through into prices.
We introduce a model in which firms limit prices because they recognize a high
market price, though directly raising profits, will induce all the firms in the market to
dissipate those profits through costly non-price competition such as advertising and
marketing. Although price is a markup over marginal cost, the size of this markup also
depends on the slope of marginal cost. If expanded production is associated not only with
an increase in marginal cost, but also with an increase in the elasticity of marginal cost with
respect to output, then the increase in marginal cost is offset by a drop in the markup. We
31show such a drop in the markup occurs provided the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is less than one. Furthermore, we show for a case in which the elasticity of
substitution is fairly close to one that this effect can mute much of the impact on price of a
cyclical increase in marginal cost. We view this model as promising for explaining many of
our empirical findings on cyclical pricing.
32Appendix: Varying capital utilization and overhead inputs
In the text we allow for movements in industry TFP arising from non-constant
returns as well as shifts in technology. In either scenario price should grow one percent less
for each one percent increase in TFP. In this appendix, we explore the robustness of this
prediction to TFP movements that reflect varying utilization of capital or increasing returns
due to overhead inputs of labor and capital.
It has often been suggested that cyclical movements in 7FP reflect procyclical,
unmeasured, variations in the utilization of inputs, particularly capital. If we allow the
production of value added to be a function of utilized capital, hkk, where hk is a measure of
the workweek of capital, then (2) becomes
n—I n—I (Iq)n
v = [an+(1—a)(hkk)] . (Al)
Following Lucas (1970), Shapiro (1995), and Bits and Klenow (1998), we assume
the cost of increased utilization of capital is reflected in extra pay for workers in the form of
shift premia for working later shifts. We write the wage bill per hour as w =w0ht.Given
(Al), this implies a choice for hk
hkn(1a) (A2) k qa
Therate of growth in the shadow price of value added is now given by
=+ (Sk )()-171( + )+ (1+ i)()(. (A3)
+5k k S,, + Sn5k k )
Comparingto equation (4), a varying hk has three impacts. The growth rate in the wage now
reflects variations in shift premium. The term in brackets reflects both increasing returns
and variations in the utilization rate of capital. This term is captured one-for-one by
including the growth rate of measured 7FF in the pricing equation, where JFP is measured
assuming constant returns and (incorrectly) a constant rate of capital utilization. Finally, the
coefficient on (----)()isnow simply 1, instead of I/a. With varying capital utilization,
3production behaves as though Cobb-Douglas even if cidoesnot equal one. It is also the case
that capital's share relative to labor's is constant, equaling q, even ifais not 1.
The upshot is that variations in capital utilization do not explain the results for price
changes above that: changes in 7J'P have an impact of much less in magnitude than —1; and
changes in sk()havean impact of much less than 1.
Suppose increasing returns arise from overhead inputs of labor and capital being
spread over more variable units in an expansion. In this case an expansion is associated with
an increase in measured 7FP, but without a corresponding decline in marginal cost. This is
not able, however, to explain the relatively small coefficient on TFPgrowthin the price
equation. Denote the overhead inputs of labor and capital as 7 and k. The net result of
ignoring these terms in our treatment above is to add the following terms to the error in the
price equation:
(1- s,)("_)i +a 1-jts,)(
Sk
)[("_)i- _)k]. (A4)
fl—fl U S,, +Sk flfl k—k
These terms will be highly positively correlated with the term (1— jis,)(SSk )(), which
is in the price equation. For example, under Cobb-Douglas production the terms reduce to
the first: (1 — Thecorrelation betweenand()inour data is .90 reflecting
the fact that the capital stock, being a stock, is much less volatile than labor hours. This
implies that ignoring overhead factors should largely have the effect of biasing upward the
coefficient on (f-)inthe price equation. But as we discussed above, the problem is that this
estimated coefficient is actually much too small.
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40</ref_section>Table 1. The Response of Price to Factors*: Dependent variable is
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
TFP -.51 -.51 -.51
(.005) (.005) (.026)







(1—s,)I.' .17 .49 .49 .74
(.016) (.013) (.013) (.062)
11 .07 .54 .53 .65
sk(—) (.015) (.012) (.012) (.064)
.30 .61 .61 .77
# of observations 16,444 16,444 16,444 720
* Estimation is by weighted least squares. Regressions include time dummies. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The 1?
2isnet of the time dummies.












*Allvariables are relative to time-period averages across the 458 industries.































k2 .61 .62 .61
# of observations 16,444 16,444 16,444
* Estimation is by weighted leastsquares. Regressions include time dummies. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The P2 is net of the time dummies.
43Table 4. The Response of Price to Current and Future Prices*:
Dependent variable is














of observations 15,994 15,022
*Estimationis by weighted least squares in Column 1 and by weighted 2sls in Column 2.
44Table 5. The Response of Price to by Industry*: Dependent variable is .








Nonelectrical Machinery .52 (.029)
Rubber .52 (.054)
Chemicals .45 (.040)
Transportation Equipment 41 (.048)
Miscellaneous Durables .41 (.050)
Stone, Glass, & Clay .39 (.04 1)
Electrical Machinery .35 (.036)
Apparel .33 (.039)
Instruments .33 (.037)




45Table 6. The Response of Price to sk(!j.)byIndustry Characteristics*:
Dependent variable is
Column 1 Column 2
TFP -.51 -.51
(.005) (.005)










# of observations 14,041 14,041
*Estimationis by weighted least squares. ER denotes the deviation of the
industry's concentration ratio from .40; NPS denotes the deviation of the
industry's non-production employment share from .25.
46Table 7. Parameter Values for the Benchmark Case
ParametersDescription
a =2/3 Labor share in output
J3 =0.99 Discount factor
=0.025 Depreciation rate
N =1/3 Steady-state hours of work
y =2 curvature in leisure in preference
o= 0.594Steady-state value in preference
=.85 substitutionelasticity between production labor and capital
in the marketing model
=1.5 steady state value of markup
e =1.3784Substitution elasticity of goods
I =2 Number of firms in the industry in the marketing model
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